Subsidiarity, republicanism, and the division of powers in Canada by Kong, Hoi L.
Revue de DROIT 
UNIVERSITÉ DE SHERBROOKE 
Titre : 
Auteur(s) : 
Revue : 
Pages : 
ISSN : 
Éditeur : 
URI : 
DOI : 
SUBSIDIARITY, REPUBLICANISM, AND THE DIVISION OF POWERS IN 
CANADA    
Hoi L. KONG 
RDUS, 2015, volume 45, numéro 1-2 
13-46
0317-9656 
Université de Sherbrooke.  Faculté de droit. 
http://hdl.handle.net/11143/9922    
https://doi.org/10.17118/11143/9922 
RDUS 
Page vide laissée intentionnellement. 
ARTICLE 
 
SUBSIDIARITY, REPUBLICANISM, 
AND THE DIVISION OF POWERS IN CANADA 
 
by Hoi L. KONG *  
 
Dans cet article, j'entreprends le projet normatif de déterminer ce que le principe 
de subsidiarité devrait signifier en droit constitutionnel canadien et comment il devrait 
être appliqué. J'argumenterai sur le fait que le principe de subsidiarité devrait être 
compris dans le cadre théorique du républicanisme et, afin de contribuer à ce numéro qui 
rend hommage à la jurisprudence constitutionnelle de la juge Deschamps, je démontrerai 
comment une de ses décisions dans un arrêt de droit constitutionnel illustre cette 
interprétation républicaine du principe de subsidiarité. Dans la première partie, j'établirai 
la pertinence de l'approche républicaine pour l'interprétation du fédéralisme canadien et 
démontrerai comment cela permet de mieux cerner le principe de subsidiarité. Brièvement, 
l'argument veut que le concept républicain de non-domination offre une norme permettant 
aux tribunaux de déterminer si les conditions du principe de subsidiarité sont satisfaites. 
La deuxième partie me permettra de présenter comment une interprétation républicaine 
du principe de subsidiarité est évidente dans la jurisprudence du fédéralisme de la juge 
Deschamps. 
 
 
The present paper undertakes the normative project of determining what 
subsidiarity should mean in Canadian constitutional law, and how it should be applied. 
In this paper, I will argue that subsidiarity should be understood in republican terms, and 
in furtherance of this special issue’s goal of offering tribute to the constitutional 
jurisprudence of Justice Deschamps, I will argue that a representative case from her 
federalism jurisprudence is consistent with a republican interpretation of subsidiarity. 
Part I sets out the case for interpreting Canadian federalism in republican terms and for 
arguing that these are relevant for understanding the principle of subsidiarity. In brief, 
the argument is that the republican idea of non-domination provides a normative 
standard that enables courts to determine whether the conditions of the principle of 
subsidiarity are satisfied. Part II turns to demonstrate how a republican application of the 
subsidiarity principle is evident in the federalism jurisprudence of Justice Deschamps. 
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The concept of subsidiarity entered Canadian federalism 
jurisprudence through the reasons of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in 
114957 Canada Ltée v. Hudson, commonly referred to as 
Spraytech.1 The oft-cited passage from the decision describes the 
principle of subsidiarity as “the proposition that law-making and 
implementation are often best achieved at a level of government that 
is not only effective, but also closest to the citizens affected and thus 
most responsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness, and to 
population diversity”.2 There are at least two situations in which 
this idea of subsidiarity is applicable in the federalism context.3   
 
First, one might understand the concept to be relevant to 
deciding disagreements about which order of government should 
implement a policy objective, once it has been enacted into law, 
when the relevant orders of government agree that one of them has 
jurisdiction to legislate with respect to that policy. Consider the case 
in which the provincial and federal governments agree that a 
particular federal policy’s goal is to reduce crime, and accept that 
the federal government has jurisdiction to enact that policy. In such 
circumstances, the governments may nonetheless disagree about 
which level of government is best positioned to implement that 
policy, and the principle of subsidiarity can be used to resolve that 
disagreement. One might ask whether, in the given circumstances, 
considerations of effectiveness, responsiveness to local needs, and 
diversity would lead to a conclusion that a provincial rather than 
the federal government should implement the federal policy.   
 
                                                            
1.  114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town of), 
[2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 [Spraytech]. 
2.  Id., par. 3.   
3.  I will be using the expressions “principle of subsidiarity”, “idea of 
subsidiarity”, “concept of subsidiarity”, “subsidiarity”, and similar 
expressions interchangeably.  The statement of the principle of 
subsidiarity in the main text is the canonical one in Canadian 
jurisprudence, and will be the one that I shall use throughout this paper.  
Other statements or definitions of the principle are, of course, possible but 
since this is a paper about Canadian federalism jurisprudence, I adopt the 
one most pertinent to that body of thought.    
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Second, one might argue that the concept of subsidiarity is 
applicable in circumstances where two levels of government 
disagree about which has jurisdiction to regulate in a particular set 
of circumstances. Consider the case of a disagreement about 
whether the federal government can legislate over specific aspects 
of artificial reproduction. Subsidiarity in that instance may be used 
to resolve the jurisdictional question. One might argue that 
concerns about effectiveness, responsiveness, and diversity should 
be relevant to determining whether the federal government’s 
attempt to regulate the relevant aspects of artificial reproduction 
would amount to an unconstitutional intrusion on provincial 
jurisdiction.   
 
 These two kinds of cases in which the concept of subsidiarity 
may be applied have given rise to debate in the jurisprudence and 
in the academic literature. For instance, the Chief Justice in 
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act4 limited the appli-
cation of the subsidiarity principle to circumstances in which 
provincial (or municipal) regulation complements federal legislation 
and enables federal purposes to be adapted to local circumstances.5 
Similarly, some scholars6 argue that the principle of subsidiarity is 
relevant only when one order of government has the undisputed 
power to enact a particular policy objective, and when the only 
question is which order of government should implement that 
objective. As a consequence, these authors argue, the principle is 
not useful for resolving disputes about which order of government 
should regulate when several conflicting policy objectives are at 
issue. Writing in the context of the European Union, Gareth Davies 
argues for this position and concludes that subsidiarity cannot 
resolve a disagreement about whether, in a particular set of 
circumstances, a Community-wide goal of achieving policy 
                                                            
4.   Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 [“AHRA 
Reference”]. 
5.  Id., par. 70, 72. 
6.  See e.g. Gareth DAVIES, “Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, 
at the Wrong Time”, (2006) 43 C.M.L. Rev. 63. 
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harmonization should outweigh national interests in autonomous 
regulation.7 
 
 If some judges and some scholars focus on circumstances in 
which the principle of subsidiarity is relevant only to questions of 
policy implementation, others argue that subsidiarity 
considerations are pertinent to cases of jurisdictional disputes. For 
instance, in the AHRA Reference, Justices LeBel and Deschamps 
reasoned that the principle may assist courts in determining 
whether legislation fits within one head of power or another. They 
invoked the subsidiary principle at the end of a long analysis that 
found that the impugned provisions of the Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act were ultra vires because, in pith and substance, 
they were legislation in relation to the provinces’ jurisdiction over 
hospitals, property and civil rights, and matters of a local or private 
nature.8 Justices LeBel and Deschamps introduced the principle by 
stating that “[i]f any doubt remained, this is where the principle of 
subsidiarity could apply”.9 This formulation suggests that in cases 
where the extrinsic and intrinsic evidence, as well as an 
examination of the legal effects of federal legislation, tends towards 
a finding that the federal government is trenching upon provincial 
jurisdiction but does not conclusively establish this finding, 
consideration of the subsidiarity principle will be relevant.10   
 
                                                            
7.  Id., 67-68.  Davies writes: “Subsidiarity misses the point.  Its central flaw 
is that instead of providing a method to balance between Member State 
and Community interests, which is what is needed, it assumes the 
Community goals, privileges their achievement absolutely, and simply 
asks who should be the one to do the implementing work.”  
8.  AHRA Reference, prec., note 4, par. 273. The discussion of the reasons of 
LeBel and Deschamps JJ. and of the Chief Justice in the paragraphs that 
follow draws on material previously published in H. KONG, “Beyond 
Functionalism”, infra note 16. 
9.  Id. 
10.  Since Justices LeBel and Deschamps only suggested that if the principle 
were to be applied, it would have led to a finding that the provisions at 
issue were ultra vires, they did not specify the details of how the principle 
would be applied in a particular case (Id.). 
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This understanding of subsidiarity is not limited to the case-
law: some scholars similarly argue that the principle of subsidiarity 
is useful in determining whether, in a given set of circumstances, 
one order of government rather than another should have 
jurisdiction to regulate. For example, Steven Calabresi and 
Lucy Bickford, writing in the U.S. context, have argued that the 
“economics of federalism” entails considerations that give content 
to the principle of subsidiarity and can assist courts in deciding 
jurisdictional disputes.11 According to the authors, economic consi-
derations can assist in determining whether state or federal 
governments should regulate a given matter. Calabresi and 
Bickford set out the advantages of state regulation: “(1) regional 
variation in preferences, (2) competition for taxpayers and 
businesses, (3) experimentation to develop the best set of rules, and 
(4) lower monitoring costs”.12  The authors contrast these with fac-
tors in the presence of which federal regulation is advantageous: (1) 
economies of scale, (2) collective action problems, (3) control of 
externalities, and (4) civil rights issues.13 The authors argue that 
the U.S. Supreme Court has used the considerations that comprise 
the “economics of federalism” to resolve jurisdictional disputes, and 
in so doing, it has ensured that matters that are best regulated at 
the state level are under the jurisdiction of the states and not of the 
federal government.14   
 
In this paper, I will argue that in Canadian federalism, the 
principle of subsidiarity should play a role in resolving jurisdictional 
disputes. I do not address in any detail the narrow doctrinal 
question of whether the principle of subsidiarity in current 
Canadian constitutional law is, as Chief Justice McLachlin claims, 
best understood as being limited to circumstances in which the 
                                                            
11.  Steven G. CALABRESI & Lucy D. BICKFORD, “Federalism and Subsidiarity: 
Perspectives from U.S. Constitutional Law”, (2011) [unpublished, 
Northwestern University of Law Scholarly Commons faculty working 
paper]. 
12.  Id., 11. 
13.  Id., 14-16.   
14.  Id., 28. 
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provinces can complement federal legislation, although I agree with 
those who argue that the scope of the principle’s application in 
positive law is broader than this. 15  Instead, the present paper 
undertakes the normative project of determining what subsidiarity 
should mean in Canadian constitutional law, and how it should be 
applied. In this paper, I will argue that subsidiarity should be 
understood in republican terms, and in furtherance of this special 
issue’s goal of offering tribute to the constitutional jurisprudence of 
Justice Deschamps, I will argue that a representative case from her 
federalism jurisprudence is consistent with a republican 
interpretation of subsidiarity.16 The paper is divided into two parts.   
 
Part I sets out the case for interpreting Canadian federalism 
in republican terms and for arguing that these are relevant for 
understanding the principle of subsidiarity. In brief, the argument 
is that the republican idea of non-domination provides a normative 
standard that enables courts to determine whether the conditions 
of the principle of subsidiarity are satisfied.  That is, the concept of 
non-domination, which I shall describe and explain below, can 
assist a court in evaluating whether, in a given set of circumstances, 
jurisdiction should be given to the provinces because they are the 
order of government that is, in the words of the Court in Spraytech, 
“closest to the citizens affected and thus most responsive to their 
needs, to local distinctiveness, and to population diversity”.17  I will 
further argue that two versions of the republican case for Canadian 
federalism — the multinational and the general case — are relevant 
                                                            
15.  See Dwight NEWMAN, “Changing Division of Powers Doctrine and the 
Emergent Principle of Subsidiarity”, (2011) 74 Sask. L. Rev. 21.  
16.  I have argued elsewhere that Justice Deschamps’s reasons in a pair of 
interjurisdictional immunity and paramountcy cases is consistent with 
her approach to the AHRA Reference, prec., note 4  (see Hoi KONG, “Beyond 
Functionalism, Formalism and Minimalism: Deliberative Democracy and 
Decision Rules in the Federalism Cases of the 2010-2011 Term”, (2011) 
55 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 355 [H. KONG, “Beyond Functionalism”]).  In his 
contribution to this volume, Professor Ryder makes an argument that 
applies to the entirety of Justice Deschamps’s jurisprudence, which is 
consistent with the one made in this paper (Bruce Ryder, citation when 
available).   
17.  AHRA Reference, prec., note 4, par. 3. 
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to determining when the conditions of subsidiarity are satisfied, 
such that the provincial order of government should have 
jurisdiction over a given subject matter, or that the federal order’s 
power should be limited. In the course of making that argument, I 
will distinguish between a normatively justifiable and a normatively 
objectionable conception of nationalism. We shall see that it is only 
the former that plays a role in the republican conception of a 
multinational federation. 
 
Part II turns to demonstrate how a republican application of 
the subsidiarity principle is evident in the federalism jurisprudence 
of Justice Deschamps  In order to set the stage for that discussion, 
I consider and reject a suggestion — made in the political theory 
literature — that the concept of non-domination cannot assist in 
determining jurisdictional questions. Once I have cleared that 
objection away, I will argue that the concept of non-domination 
animates Justice Deschamps’s application of the principle of 
subsidiarity in the context of interpreting the criminal law power. 
In particular, I will argue that Justice Deschamps’s application of 
the principle of subsidiarity has implications for how broadly the 
criminal power is read, and for how much deference should be 
accorded Parliament. We shall see that the concept of non-
domination is central to her conclusions about these matters, and 
that it influences her conclusion that the division of powers 
jurisprudence should limit the reach of the criminal power in order 
to ensure that the provincial governments can function as loci of 
distinctiveness and diversity. We will, in other words, see that 
Justice Deschamps’s vision of federalism jurisprudence evinces a 
republican-influenced understanding of the principle of 
subsidiarity.   
  
Part I: Republicanism, Subsidiarity, and the Division of Powers 
in Canada 
 
I have argued elsewhere for a republican conception of 
Canadian federalism that builds on the concept of non-domination 
and draws extensively on the multinational elements of the 
Canadian federation. In what follows, I will restate the core of the 
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argument, before demonstrating that it can be extended beyond the 
multinational elements of the Canadian federation to include the 
general relationship between the federal and provincial 
governments.18   
 
Republicanism has emerged as an important school of 
thought in political theory and has exerted a strong influence on 
Anglo-American legal scholarship.19  Republicanism has, however, 
been largely absent from Canadian constitutional law scholarship,20 
and this absence is particularly noticeable in the legal literature on 
federalism. Republicanism, of course, includes many different 
strands, some of which I have analysed in other work.21  For present 
purposes, I adopt a particular version of republicanism, which 
stresses the norm of non-domination, 22  because it provides a 
                                                            
18.  The following paragraphs on multinational republican federalism draw 
from Hoi KONG, “Republicanism and the Division of Powers in Canada”, 
(2014) 64 U.T.L.J. 259 [H. KONG, “Republicanism”].  I am grateful to Justice 
Deschamps for suggesting such a broad application of my analysis in her 
response to this paper.   
19.   For a survey, see Samantha BESSON & José Luis MARTÍ, “Law and 
Republicanism: Mapping the Issues” in Samantha BESSON & 
José Luis MARTÍ (eds.), Legal Republicanism: National and International 
Perspectives, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 3. 
20.  For an exception, see Hoi KONG, “Towards a Civic Republican Theory of 
Canadian Constitutional Law”, (2011) 15 Rev. Const. Stud. 249 [H. KONG, 
“Civic Republican Theory”]. 
21.    Hoi KONG, “Something to Talk About: Regulation and Justification in 
Canadian Municipal Law”, (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall L.J., 499, 502-505. 
22.   There is an extensive literature on the relationship between republicanism 
and liberalism and, in particular, on the contrast between the republican 
concept of non-domination and the liberal concept of non-interference. For 
present purposes, I will accept one key distinction made by republican 
authors, who claim that an agent may dominate another and, as a 
consequence, may inflict harms that legal institutions should aim to 
prevent or remedy, even if that agent does not interfere with the dominated 
party’s interests.  For present purposes, I will accept the distinction 
between non-interference and non-domination to be the defining cleavage 
that separates liberalism from republicanism, and I identify republicanism 
with the concept of non-domination.  For the distinction, see Philip PETTIT, 
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1997, p. 52 [P. PETTIT, Republicanism].  For the debate 
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promising normative framework for analyzing the multinational 
elements of Canadian federalism23 and because it is perhaps the 
most influential contemporary strain of republican theory. As a 
consequence, for the remainder of this paper, when I refer to 
republicanism, I mean this non-domination version of the theory. 
In what follows, I will show how republicanism applies to the 
multinational elements of Canadian federalism, and I will extend 
the argument about the significance of the norm of non-domination 
to the general relationship between the orders of government in the 
Canadian federation. Let us begin by fleshing out the idea of non-
domination.   
 
A.  Non-Domination and the Division of Powers in Canada 
 
According to Philip Pettit, who is most closely identified with 
the republican theory of domination, state action can be non-
dominating if it tracks “common, perceived interests”;24 this is the 
                                                            
surrounding the distinction, see e.g. Ian CARTER, “How are Power and 
Unfreedom Related?” in Cécile LABORDE & John MAYNOR (eds.), 
Republicanism and Political Theory, Malden, Blackwell, 2008, p. 58; 
Quentin SKINNER, “Freedom as the Absence of Arbitrary Power” in Cécile 
LABORDE & John MAYNOR (eds.), Republicanism and Political Theory, 
Malden, Blackwell, 2008, p. 83; Philip PETTIT, “Republican Freedom: Three 
Axioms, Four Theorems” in Cécile LABORDE & John MAYNOR (eds.), 
Republicanism and Political Theory, Malden, Blackwell, 2008, p. 102; 
Charles LARMORE, “A Critique of Philip Pettit’s Republicanism”, (2001) 11 
Philosophical Issues 229. 
23.  There are important American contributions to the legal literature on 
republicanism and federalism. For a general treatment, see Mark TUSHNET, 
“Federalism and the Traditions of American Political Theory”, (1985) 9 
Ga. L. Rev. 981, 989-90; for a criticism of multinational federations 
including Canada, which argues that they undermine some of the 
purposes of federalism, see Steven G. CALABRESI, “A Government of Limited 
and Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States v. Lopez”, (1995) 94 
Mich. L. Rev. 752, 764. 
24.  Philip PETTIT, “Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization” in 
Ian SHAPIRO & Casiano HACKER-CORDÓN (eds.), Democracy’s Value 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999 163, 172 [P. PETTIT, 
“Contestatory Democratization”]. See generally James BOHMAN, 
“Cosmopolitan Republicanism and the Rule of Law” in Samantha BESSON 
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case even when state action has coercive effects.25 Pettit defines the 
relevant interests as those “that are consistent with the desire to 
live under a shared scheme that treats no one as special. They are 
interests that those who are expected to give a system of 
government their allegiance may reasonably expect a government to 
track”.26 When state action tracks these kinds of interests, Pettit 
argues, it accords with reasons related to the public good and is 
non-dominating.27 Pettit fits his account of non-domination and 
state action within a wider account of non-domination that applies 
to private relations when he sets out the conditions under which 
one party has dominating power over another. He writes that one 
has dominating power over another if one has (1) “the capacity to 
interfere (2) on an arbitrary basis (3) in certain choices that the 
other is in a position to make”.28 In the context of the state, action 
is undertaken on an arbitrary basis when it is “sectional or factional 
in character”.29  Such action does not attempt to track common 
perceived interests of all within a given polity, and instead merely 
reflects the interests and the political will of a segment of society. 
Note that on this understanding of domination, a party can be 
dominated even if there is no interference with her interests. How, 
then, are we to determine whether state action bears these 
characteristics or when the state stands in a relationship of 
domination vis-à-vis its citizens?  
 
                                                            
& José Luis MARTÍ (eds.), Legal Republicanism: National and International 
Perspectives, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 60, at p. 61. 
25.  Pettit contrasts his position with others which view laws as necessarily 
curtailing freedom (P. PETTIT, Id., p. 168-69).  Pettit uses the modifiers 
“commonly perceived” and “politically avowable” interchangeably in his 
writings to describe the relevant interests.  For the former usage see id.  
For the latter usage, see Philip PETTIT, A Theory of Freedom: From the 
Psychology to the Politics of Agency, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, p. 156.     
26.  Id., p. 176. 
27.  See P. PETTIT, Republicanism, prec., note 22. 
28.  Id., p. 52.  
29.  Id., p. 56.  
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Pettit provides us with two kinds of indicia. The first relates 
to a given polity’s perception of an instance of domination. He 
argues that it will be “common knowledge” when the conditions of 
domination are met in a particular set of circumstances.30 The 
second kind of indicia relates to the costs of being dominated by 
another. One who is subject to the arbitrary will of another 
individual or of the state suffers in three ways: (1) from uncertainty 
about when her interests will be interfered with, (2) from having to 
constantly act with strategic deference towards the dominating 
party, and (3) from not being able to engage with the dominating 
party as an equal.31 Pettit applies these indicia in the course of 
making arguments in favor of institutional proposals that counter 
domination. One can identify these indicia in Canadian 
constitutional history and one can see versions of these kinds of 
institutional constraints in Canadian constitutional law bearing on 
the multinational elements of the federation.   
 
French Canadians32 at Confederation would reasonably have 
thought it likely that a government in a unified Province of Canada, 
                                                            
30.  Id., p. 59.  According to Pettit, the fact of domination’s being common 
knowledge is both empirically likely and normatively significant.  It is 
empirically likely because the fact of domination is salient to all those 
involved in a relationship of domination (Id.).  Pettit argues that common 
knowledge of an instance of domination is normatively significant because 
the harms in relationships of domination arise when those who are party 
to the relationship are aware of them.  According to Pettit: “Domination is 
going to involve awareness on the part of the powerful, the awareness of 
vulnerability on the part of the powerless, and the mutual awareness 
— indeed, the common awareness among all the parties to the 
relationship — of this consciousness on each side” (Id., p. 60).  
31.  Id., p. 87. 
32.  Deciding upon the appropriate nomenclature for the nation under 
discussion is a fraught exercise. For present purposes, I label the 
population who constituted the minority nation to be protected at the time 
of Confederation as “French Canadians” because that was the term used 
by participants in the Confederation debates, including, for instance, A.A. 
Dorion. I shift the terminology to “Quebecers” post-Confederation for two 
reasons. First, in the post-Confederation period Quebec became the 
repository of nationalist aspirations, and those aspirations came to be 
expressed in jurisdictional claims (see Stephen TIERNEY, Constitutional Law 
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in which they would be a persistent minority, would be persistently 
indifferent or hostile to their collective interests and therefore would 
fail to make decisions that tracked those interests. The institutional 
solution advanced by some fathers of Confederation, including 
George-Étienne Cartier, was to create a political unit in which this 
persistent doubt about the nature of the reasons motivating 
government action would be removed.33 Under a federalist regime 
that would give democratically elected and controlled governments 
in Quebec jurisdictional control over the vast majority of 
government decisions and policies that would affect citizens’ lives, 
it would no longer be possible for French Canadians (the vast 
majority of whom would live on the territory of Quebec) to 
persistently doubt that the institutions of popularly elected 
governments would track their collective interests.34 The Consti-
tution Act, 1867 provided just such a set of institutions.   
 
Canadian federalism can thus plausibly be characterized as 
facilitating republican decision-making and responding to a 
                                                            
and National Pluralism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 101). 
Second, I believe that the term “Quebecer” is appropriate for the post-
Confederation period because an essential function of the institutions of a 
political jurisdiction is to speak for the residents of that jurisdiction as a 
whole. See on this point Philip PETTIT, “A Republican Law of Peoples”, 
(2010) 9 European Journal of Political Theory 70, 71. Moreover, such 
institutions can legitimately speak in this way when residents of a 
jurisdiction pursue common ends through those institutions. This 
understanding of jurisdictions and their institutions is significant because 
domination of a jurisdiction arises in the federalism context only when a 
jurisdiction and its institutions have this representative function. In a 
different context, Pettit describes the domination of collective agencies 
such as the state in this way: “domination of corporate agencies will matter 
insofar as those agencies are organizations whereby individual human 
beings combine to act together. If the things that the members do as a 
corporate entity are subject to alien control of another agent or agency, 
then those members are themselves subject to alien control” (Id., 76). 
33.  See Christopher MOORE, 1867: How the Fathers Made a Deal, Toronto, 
McClelland & Stewart, 1997, p. 142-143. 
34.  See for the relevant history, A.I. SILVER, The French-Canadian Idea of 
Confederation, 1864-1900, 2nd ed., Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 
1997, p. 3. 
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particular threat of domination. In other work, I have made a 
detailed argument for the claim that the Canadian federation was 
structured to safeguard a set of collective interests, which should 
be construed as national interests, from the threat of domination.35  
I will not repeat that argument here. Instead, I will simply note that 
when the activities that constitute a nation (including activities tied 
to the creation of a common public culture) and the goods that flow 
from these activities (including goods relating to the individual 
autonomy of group members) require state institutions that are 
controlled by members of the nation, nations can make a plausible 
claim to a measure of self-government.  
 
For a minority nation in a multinational federation, this 
claim can be framed in terms of the principle of non-domination. 
For instance, French Canadians at Confederation may reasonably 
have believed that they could not ensure that in a state dominated 
by English Canadians, the relevant group activities and goods 
would be secured.36 They might have been concerned, for instance, 
that institutions necessary to sustain the common public culture of 
French Canada, such as schools and courts competent to 
adjudicate civil law matters, might have been threatened in such a 
state. French Canadians at Confederation might also have believed 
that the protection of this common public culture was necessary in 
order for individual members of the nation to forge identities and 
benefit from cultural goods that could only result from participation 
in such a culture. Indeed, French Canadians might have reasonably 
believed that in such a state, any claims they made in relation to 
such activities or goods would be the object of outright hostility or 
indifference.37 They would therefore have reasonably believed that 
                                                            
35.  H. KONG, “Republicanism”, prec., note 18. 
36.  For an argument that this group constituted a nation, see Eugénie 
BROUILLET, La négation de la nation : L’identité culturelle québécoise et le 
fédéralisme canadien, Sillery, Septentrion, 2005, p. 53. 
37.  For a survey of assimliationist policies directed at French Canadians 
before Confederation, see Stéphane KELLY, La petite loterie : comment la 
Couronne a obtenu la collaboration du Canada français après 1837, 
Montréal, Éditions du Boréal, 1997.  There is an extensive debate about 
whether rights should be ascribed to nations, rather than to the 
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a government enacting policy based on majoritarian decision-
making procedures would fail to track their interests in engaging in 
these activities and securing these goods. It was the potential 
persistent failure of governments in the United Province of Canada 
to track these kinds of interests that would have placed French 
Canadians in a relationship of domination with respect to the 
English Canadian majority.  
 
These interests were politically avowable, according to 
Pettit’s indicia: first, as we have seen above, the Confederation 
debates revealed that it was common knowledge to the Canadian 
public in the period leading to Confederation that such interests 
were among those that French Canadians could reasonably have 
expected to have safeguarded by the constitutional order. Second, 
the absence of constitutional safeguards would have rendered 
French Canadians vulnerable to the effects of domination: they 
would have been under persistent threat of having their national 
interests interfered with; they would have had to engage in strategic 
deference in their relationships with English Canadians with 
respect to those interests; and because those interests would not 
have been secure, they would not have been able to engage with 
English Canadians on an equal footing. Federal arrangements, 
which would allocate jurisdictional authority in order to enable 
French Canadians themselves to pursue their national interests, 
would have extricated French Canadians from this relationship of 
domination. It is for these reasons that we can conceive of the 
                                                            
individuals within them.  See the contributions to Will KYMLICKA (ed.), The 
Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.  I do 
not intend to take a firm stance on this question, but only address it to 
the extent of noting that the central institutional settlement in 
Confederation of the claims related to the French Canadian nation took 
the form of creating a jurisdiction.  As a result, claims with respect to this 
particular collective interest have been advanced in Canadian 
constitutional law in jurisdictional terms.  The contours of the collective 
interest may be contested, and it may be that the ultimate justification for 
advancing that collective interest lies in the individuals that form the 
collective, but the institutional fact of the jurisdiction means that interests 
are articulated in terms of the polity that constitutes the jurisdiction, and 
thus in collective terms.    
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Confederation debates as evincing the concept of a multinational 
republican federation.    
    
There is a real risk, however, that specific conceptions of 
nations will become fixed with reference to markers of ethnic 
identity. The Confederation debates as I have presented them are 
open to being interpreted in light of such a conception of nations 
and nationalism.  According to this interpretation, representatives 
of groups defined exclusively by language and religion sought an 
institutional settlement that recognized and constituted, through 
jurisdictional boundaries, two nations that were defined by these 
markers of ethnic identity.  Yet such an ethnocentric conception of 
nationalism would distort both the constitutional settlement and 
the evolving nature of the federation. Key elements of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 aimed to protect the rights of minority group 
members who were presumed not to control the levers of power 
within a given political jurisdiction; these elements evidence a 
political desire to combat the creation of homogenous political units 
in which all traces of linguistic and religious difference would be 
effaced.38   
 
In addition, the current cultural diversity of Quebec suggests 
that any attempt to ascribe to it an ethnocentric identity is 
problematic as an empirical and normative matter. Quebec today 
can be understood to constitute a nation because its history is 
distinctive, as is its shared public culture and sense of belonging, 
but these elements of nationhood are not the exclusive property of 
any single ethnically defined group.39 They represent, rather, an 
ongoing narrative to which members of diverse communities, as well 
as citizens who do not identify with any particular community, 
contribute. The contours and contents of that narrative are 
contested.  It is this ongoing and fluid conversation that constitutes 
the Quebec nation. The authors of the Bouchard-Taylor Report have 
recently described the sociological fact of ethnocultural diversity in 
                                                            
38.  See discussion of section 93 and the powers of disallowance and 
reservation, in H. KONG, “Republicanism”, prec., note 18. 
39.  David MILLER, On Nationality, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997. 
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Quebec and offered a way of conceiving of the national culture that 
incorporates this diversity. The authors of the report write:  
 
[T]he members of the ethnic minorities can become valuable 
interlocutors in the search for new questions to be asked 
on Québec’s past. They can also substantially enrich 
Québec’s collective memory by contributing to it their own 
stories. The edification and dissemination of the collective 
memory can contribute powerfully to making known and 
promoting common values.40   
 
This understanding of Quebec’s common values, and the role 
of minority groups in constructing them, resonates with the idea of 
a nation as a contested narrative and is the very antithesis of a 
conception of nationalism that would define a nation on 
ethnocentric grounds. If membership in a nation is defined by one’s 
willingness to contribute to the narrative project of defining the 
nation, rather than by criteria that are limited to those of a 
particular ethnocultural background, all citizens in a given polity 
are eligible to be considered as members of the nation. State 
regulation that reflects this conception of the nation will more likely 
take into consideration the common perceived interests of all who 
are affected by it than will regulation that evinces an 
ethnocentrically defined conception of the nation. We have seen 
above that domination results when regulation fails to consider 
these kinds of interests. To the extent that the policies of a state 
inevitably reflect a national identity,41 states that ascribe to an 
ethnocentric view of nationhood will more likely create conditions 
of domination than will states that adhere to the view for which this 
paper argues. It is for this reason that an ethnocentric view of 
nationalism is normatively inferior to one that conceives of 
nationalism more broadly and in ways that recognize the existence 
of diversity within the jurisdictional boundaries of the nation. 
                                                            
40.  Gérard BOUCHARD & Charles TAYLOR, Building the Future: A Time for 
Reconciliation, Québec, Government of Québec, 2008, p. 127, online: 
<www.accommodements-quebec.ca/documentation/rapports/rapport-
final-integral-en.pdf>.     
41.  See Ferran  REQUEJO, Multinational Federalism and Value Pluralism: The 
Spanish Case, New York, Routledge, 2005. 
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B.  Subsidiarity, Multinationalism, and Non-Domination 
 
To this point, I have argued for a multinational republican 
understanding of Canadian federalism. I have not, however, 
explained how that understanding is relevant to the principle of 
subsidiarity. I do so now, before turning in the next section to the 
discussion about a general, rather than multinational, republican 
conception of federalism and how that general conception can 
incorporate the principle of subsidiarity. Recall that the principle of 
subsidiarity, in its canonical formulation in Canadian law, states 
that “law-making and implementation are often best achieved at a 
level of government that is not only effective, but also closest to the 
citizens affected and thus most responsive to their needs, to local 
distinctiveness, and to population diversity”. 42  In order for this 
principle to be applied effectively, courts need some means of 
determining when its conditions are satisfied. In other words, a 
court intent on applying the principle would need criteria to 
determine when law-making is best achieved at the local level in 
ways that enhance regulatory responsiveness to local diversity and 
population diversity.  
    
We have seen that Calabresi and Bickford have set out, in 
what they call “the economics of federalism”, considerations for 
determining when the principle of subsidiarity’s conditions are 
satisfied. According to the authors, U.S. states should have 
jurisdiction to regulate when state regulation yields the advantages 
that are understood to inhere in the concept of subsidiarity, 
including responsiveness to variations in local preferences (as 
evidenced by, for example, policies that facilitate efficient sub-
federal competition for taxpayers). Moreover, Calabresi and 
Bickford argue that states should have jurisdiction when state 
regulation does not give rise to problems that only federal regulation 
can address (including negative externalities).43 The concept of non-
domination as it applies to multinational federations, can similarly 
assist courts in determining when sub-federal regulation fulfills 
                                                            
42.  Spraytech, prec., note 1, par. 3.   
43.  S.G. CALABRESI and L.D. BICKFORD, prec., note 11. 
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subsidiarity’s function of protecting local and, in particular, 
multinational diversity. 
   
Moreover, a conception of subsidiarity that is infused by the 
multinational principle of non-domination can also place principled 
limits on federal power.44 Such a conception would specify when the 
value of multinational diversity, at the local level, is threatened by 
federal regulation. In particular, such a conception would specify 
when a province charged with safeguarding such diversity is 
threatened by domination, in the sense set out above.  Federalism 
doctrines that evince this multinational republican conception of 
subsidiarity would protect against such threats, and it is to a 
consideration of how federalism doctrine in general can instantiate 
this conception of federalism that I turn to in opening sections of 
the next Part. The paper will conclude with reflections on how 
Justice Deschamps’s federalism jurisprudence in particular reflects 
this conception of subsidiarity. Yet before I turn to the discussion 
of federalism doctrine, I will extend my arguments about republican 
federalism beyond the multinational case. The general case will 
reveal that the republican account can apply to those elements of 
Canadian federalism that do not give rise to multinational concerns. 
 
C.  Republican Federalism: The General Case 
  
Authors have made the case for a republican conception of 
federalism in the context of the American federation.45 Because the 
United States is not a multinational federation, I call the republican 
argument made in that context the “general case”.  Although the 
details of the argument vary among authors, its core is that the 
                                                            
44.  In this respect, subsidiarity helps to identify which polity and which set of 
democratic institutions should regulate a certain subject matter, and 
fulfills what Nick Barber has called the purpose of democratic structuring.  
See Nicholas.W. BARBER, “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity”, (2005) 11 
Eur. L.J. 308.   
45.  See e.g. Cass R. SUNSTEIN, “Interest Groups in American Public Law”, 
(1985) 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 44; S. Candice HOKE, “Preemption Pathologies 
and Civic Republican Values”, (1991) 71 B.U.L. Rev. 685; Cass R. SUNSTEIN, 
“Beyond the Republican Revival”, (1988) 97 Yale L.J. 1539, 1561-62, 1578 
[C.R. SUNSTEIN, “Revival”].  
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institutions of American federalism collectively constitute a system 
that aims to check forms of domination. I label the two kinds of 
institutional mechanisms by which domination is controlled the 
“perspectival” and “deliberative” checks.     
  
 Recall that domination occurs when state action fails to track 
the common, politically avowable interests of citizens. We have seen 
above that such a failure can arise in cases where a minority group 
is vulnerable to the will of the majority. Majorities can fail to track 
minority interests out of hostility or indifference, which result from 
the fact that the majority does not share the perspective of the 
minority. 46  The institutions of federalism can be understood to 
address some situations in which a lack of shared perspective is 
likely to result in dominating legislation. For example, when state 
governments, which are most attuned to the local needs of citizens, 
are given the power to legislate, they can counteract the risk that 
federal legislators who are distant from those needs will enact 
legislation that is indifferent to them.47 Similarly, American federal 
legislators who are attuned to federation-wide concerns can enact 
appropriate legislation, whereas state governments that focus only 
on local needs may enact legislation that is indifferent to these wider 
concerns and may therefore harm the interests of citizens in other 
states.48 Each of these justifications for federalism’s institutions 
thus focuses on the institutions’ capacity to counteract the risk that 
one order of government’s failure to adopt the relevant regulatory 
                                                            
46.  See H. KONG, “Republicanism”, prec., note 18.  Scholars writing about 
discrimination in the disability argue that the absence of a shared 
perspective can lead a majority to construct a social understanding of a 
minority group that imposes on the latter disadvantages that amount to 
discrimination.  See e.g.  Diane POTHIER, “Miles to Go: Some Personal 
Reflections on the Social Construction of Disability”, (1992) 14 Dal. L.J. 
526. 
47.  See S.C. HOKE, prec., note 45, 710-11. 
48.  Scholars have characterized this basis for federal legislative power as being 
grounded in a concern about negative externalities.  See e.g. 
Jonathan R. MACEY, “Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the 
Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of 
Federalism”, (1990) 76 Va. L. Rev. 265. 
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perspective will yield legislation that is dominating, in the sense set 
out above. 
 
 In addition to this perspectival function, the institutions of 
federalism can promote deliberation. We saw above that domination 
can arise when state action results from exercises of factional will, 
and in particular when the state fails to offer a reasoned 
justification for its actions. Republican theorists have argued that 
governance mechanisms that facilitate deliberation and require 
justifications for state action can counter this threat of 
domination.49 According to a republican conception of American 
federalism, the legislatures of each order of government were 
designed to be forums of this kind of deliberation, as were the 
courts.50  In this understanding, each of these forums was to be a 
site in which the constitutional allocation of jurisdiction was 
debated and discussed. A federal system does not guarantee that 
such deliberation will occur within these bodies. However, 
deliberation and reason-giving is more likely to arise when different 
orders of government call one another to constitutional account, 
than in a system in which those who hold political power are not 
required to justify their exercises of power in constitutional terms. 
In addition, some authors argue that because state and local 
governments are most accessible to citizens, they are the primary 
vehicles through which citizens can engage deliberatively in political 
life.51  Hoke, for instance, argues that “subnational governments’ 
primary role should be to serve as the vehicles through which 
citizens attempt to shape their world — not merely their locality”.52  
When citizens engage in deliberation through these sub-federal 
                                                            
49.  See e.g. Philip PETTIT, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and 
Model of Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 
p. 433.   
50.  See e.g. C.R. SUNSTEIN, “Revival”, prec., note 45. 
51.  See S.C. HOKE, prec., note 45, 712-13. 
52.  Id., 713. 
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legislative bodies, the republican argues, they exercise self-rule and 
reduce the risk of domination by factions.53  
 
How, then, should we distinguish the general republican 
conception of federalism from the multinational one discussed 
above?  The distinction turns on notions of affiliation. In the United 
States, residents of particular states do not typically conceive of 
themselves as compatriots by virtue of their state citizenship. 
Instead, these residents locate their sense of patriotism at the 
federal level, and thus the nation that they belong to is the American 
nation. There is only one nation, whose locus of authority and 
loyalty lies in the federal government.54  Authors have argued in the 
Canadian context that citizens who reside in provinces other than 
Quebec similarly conceive of themselves as members of the 
Canadian nation, for whom the locus of authority and loyalty is the 
federal government.55  
 
Nonetheless, under the more general republican conception 
of federalism that I have just sketched out, citizens of any Canadian 
province or U.S. state would resist domination by the federal 
government because such domination exacerbates the risk of 
factional rule. A federation in which the federal government is 
unconstrained would lack checks that safeguard citizens against 
legislation enacted from a perspective which fails to account for 
their local interests. In addition, an unconstrained federal 
government would be empowered to act in response to the 
exigencies of political will alone, rather than for reasons that are 
                                                            
53.  This deliberative argument can be tied to the perspectival one. One might 
argue that because sub-federal governments are the primary loci of citizen 
deliberation, there should be a presumption that they have jurisdictional 
authority. That presumption would, however, be defeated and the federal 
government would have jurisdiction when a provincial government fails to 
consider the interests of citizens who live in other provinces.  For an 
argument along these lines, see the discussion of YOUNG, infra, note 62.     
54.  See S.G. CALABRESI, prec., note 23.   
55.  See e.g. Jeremy WEBBER, Reimagining Canada: Language, Culture, 
Community and the Canadian Constitution, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1994.  See also Jacob T. LEVY, “Self-Determination, Non-
Determination, and Federalism”, (2008) 23 Hypatia 70. 
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expressed in constitutionally defined jurisdictional terms. 
Moreover, the division of powers is necessary, according to the 
robust republican conception articulated by Hoke, because 
provincial or state legislatures are forums of deliberation in which 
citizens are best able to exercise their deliberative capacities and 
therefore resist domination by factions within the provinces or the 
states.     
 
 In this Part, I have argued for two versions of the republican 
conception of federalism. The first, multinational version conceives 
of jurisdictional boundaries as limits on the capacity of the federal 
government to dominate sub-federal national communities. The 
second, general version conceives of jurisdictional boundaries as 
mechanisms to check factional will and to induce political 
deliberation.  In both cases, the principle of non-domination 
specifies when the values entailed by the concept of subsidiarity are 
threatened. According to a multinational republican conception of 
federalism, local diversity in a multinational federal state is 
preserved if the politically avowable interests of sub-federal national 
communities are protected Similarly, the general republican 
conception of federalism identifies means by which the principle of 
subsidiarity is safeguarded. According to this conception, the 
constitutional division of powers (1) limits the risk that a federal 
government will fail to adopt a relevant, local perspective and 
cannot be justified in constitutional terms, and (2) enables 
provincial legislatures to function as deliberative forums for 
citizens. The argument in this Part has been presented at a high 
level of abstraction. In the next Part, we shall see how these abstract 
arguments about republicanism and the principle of subsidiarity 
play out in concrete doctrinal terms.   
 
Part II: Republicanism, Subsidiarity, and Federalism Doctrine 
 
 It is perhaps helpful to begin our discussion of the 
relationship between the principles of non-domination and 
subsidiarity on the one hand, and federalism doctrine on the other, 
by recalling the effects of being subject to domination. One who is 
subject to the arbitrary will of another individual or of the state 
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suffers in three ways: (1) from uncertainty about when her interests 
will be interfered with, (2) from having to constantly act with 
strategic deference towards the dominating party, and (3) from not 
being able to engage with the dominating party as an equal.56 We 
saw above that the constitutional entrenchment of the jurisdiction 
of Quebec aimed in part to protect French Canadians from the 
effects of being subject to the arbitrary will of the English Canadian 
majority.  We saw also that under a general republican conception 
of federalism, provinces have an interest in protecting their 
jurisdiction, because unconstrained federal authority increases the 
risk that federal power will be exercised without considering 
relevant provincial interests. Yet mere entrenchment is not 
sufficient to safeguard against domination. The rules that police 
jurisdictional boundaries may subject a province to domination by 
giving federal powers an unlimited scope or by permitting the 
federal government to act for reasons that are unrelated to the 
constitution’s norms. Open-ended federal powers place the federal 
government in the position of being able to interfere persistently 
with provincial interests, while constitutionally unconstrained 
powers enable the federal government to act for reasons of political 
will alone. Such action, according to the republican theorist, is 
arbitrary. Such arbitrary action violates the principle of subsidiarity 
because it undermines the capacity of provinces, as the 
governments closest to the people, to be responsive to their needs. 
It also undermines the provincial governments’ capacity to protect 
the distinctiveness of their political communities and to safeguard 
diversity within the federation.  Federalism doctrine can constrain 
this form of arbitrary action and thus serve the aims of subsidiarity 
in at least two ways.  
 
A.  Federalism Doctrine and Non-Domination 
 
First, federalism doctrine can ensure that no order of 
government has so extensive a scope of jurisdiction that it 
eliminates the other jurisdiction’s effective regulatory capacity. The 
                                                            
56.  See P. PETTIT, Republicanism, prec., note 22, p. 87. 
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very purpose of the Parsons doctrine of mutual modification is to 
protect against this outcome. The reasoning in Citizens 
Insurance Co. v. Parsons 57  aims to prevent either the broadly 
phrased federal trade and commerce power or the broadly phrased 
provincial property and civil rights power from being interpreted so 
expansively that the other power has no meaningful content.58 
Moreover, in federations with conflict rules that favor the federal 
order, it is particularly important to ensure that the federal powers 
are not over-weaning, even if provincial powers have a similarly 
broad scope. If the federal government has an effective capacity to 
regulate without constitutional constraint in areas where the 
provinces also have jurisdiction, provincial regulation will be under 
constant threat of being rendered inoperative because of the conflict 
rule.59 Such a constant threat of interference exposes all provinces 
to a risk of domination and is particularly harmful to sub-federal 
jurisdictions that are loci of national identity, as it undermines the 
capacity of provincial governments to regulate in ways that affirm 
that identity.  
 
In addition to limiting the scope of jurisdictional authority, 
federalism doctrine can specify what kinds of reasons governments 
may consider when legislating. In particular, federalism doctrine in 
Canada controls the risk that a government will act for reasons of 
political will alone, and not be constrained by constitutionally 
imposed jurisdictional limits.  These risks give rise to republican 
concerns because each order of government has what Pettit would 
call a common perceived interest in ensuring that the other order’s 
actions be limited by constitutional norms. Controversies in 
Canadian federalism often arise when the scope of jurisdictional 
                                                            
57.  Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons, [1881] 7 A.C. 96 (P.C.).  
58.  On this point, see William Ralph LEDERMAN, Continuing Canadian 
Constitutional Dilemmas: Essays on the Constitutional History, Public Law 
and Federal System of Canada, Toronto, Butterworths, 1981, p. 274. 
59.  For this concern, see generally Bruce RYDER, “The End of Umpire? 
Federalism and Judicial Restraint”, (2006) 34 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 345; 
Eugénie BROUILLET, “The Federal Principle and the 2005 Balance of Powers 
in Canada”, (2006) 34 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 307. 
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authority and the degree of deference to be given to the political 
branches’ judgements about jurisdiction are at issue, and such 
controversies sound in the language of domination.60 Because of 
the doctrine of paramountcy, the threat of domination is 
particularly acute for the provinces. If the federal government is 
given extensive jurisdiction to regulate in areas that touch on 
provincial interests, and if, because it has been granted essentially 
unlimited deference with respect to its jurisdictional judgments, it 
can do so for reasons of political will alone, then the provinces will 
be vulnerable to persistent and arbitrary interference from the 
federal government. This kind of interference would be arbitrary, in 
the sense articulated by Pettit, because the reasons behind the 
governmental action would not track the common perceived 
interests of the provinces in having their jurisdiction safeguarded 
by constitutional limits. And because Quebec is a vehicle for 
national aspirations, this degree of vulnerability places it in a 
specific relationship of domination vis-à-vis the federal government. 
       
Before I demonstrate how Justice Deschamps’s 
jurisprudence has sought to limit the scope of federal authority and 
controlled the reasons for which the federal government can act, 
and thereby sought to advance the principle of subsidiarity, by 
reducing the risk of domination in the Canadian federation, I will 
address a debate between political theorists about whether the 
concept of non-domination can assist in deciding jurisdictional 
questions. If skepticism about the concept’s utility in this respect is 
warranted, then we would have reasons to doubt whether it should 
be incorporated into judicial doctrine, irrespective of whether 
existing doctrine can be interpreted to incorporate it. In what 
follows we shall see that this skepticism is unwarranted. 
 
                                                            
60.  For analyses of the criminal law and spending powers that exhibit a similar 
concern for the scope, justification and application of open-ended federal 
powers, see H. KONG, “Beyond Functionalism”, prec., note 16; Hoi KONG, 
“The Spending Power, Constitutional Interpretation and Legal 
Pragmatism”, (2008) 34 Queen’s L.J. 305. 
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B.  Non-Domination and Non-Interference: Levy’s Objection to 
Young 
 
In her later writings, Iris Marion Young articulated a theory 
of federalism as non-domination that has been criticized by 
Jacob Levy.61 Young argued that a “prima facie principle of non-
interference in the internal jurisdiction of a self-determining unit 
may be suspended” under four conditions: (1) to prevent 
domination by one unit of another; (2) to prevent the domination 
within a unit of some members of that unit; (3) to prevent one unit’s 
engaging in self-regarding activities that harm other units; and (4) 
to facilitate the capacity of particular units to meaningfully pursue 
autonomy and interact and negotiate with other units. 62  Levy 
challenges the claim that non-domination can function as a 
jurisdictional principle. 
 
According to Levy, jurisdictional rules are by their very 
nature institutionalized decision-making rules, and these cannot 
reliably function “if, in order to know who has the authority to 
decide a particular question, the merits of the question must first 
be decided”.63 The use of non-domination as a jurisdictional prin-
ciple, argues Levy, requires a decision-maker to decide the merits 
of political units’ actions in order to apply the decision rule and 
therefore introduces an unacceptable level of uncertainty and 
instability into decision-making. By contrast, Levy contends, a rigid 
and clear rule of non-interference is a true decision rule that 
allocates rights to political units.64 Finally, Levy suggests that non-
domination may function as the standard that decides ex ante 
which polity within a federation ought to have jurisdictional 
authority over which matters, but once that determination is made, 
                                                            
61.  For a description of the theory and a statement of the criticism, see 
J.T. LEVY, prec., note 55. 
62.  Iris Marion YOUNG, Global Challenges: War, Self-Determination and 
Responsibility for Justice, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007, p. 66 [I.M. YOUNG, 
Global Challenges]. 
63.  J.T. LEVY, prec., note 55, 70. 
64.  Id., 72.   
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the question of who has jurisdiction over a particular quotidian 
matter should be governed by a strict rule of non-interference.65 
 
I would like to engage Levy over the question of the role that 
the principle of non-domination can play in the judicial resolution 
of federalism disputes. The first thing to note is that jurisdictional 
rules as they actually exist in federations are persistently open to 
interpretation. Even relatively bright line rules of jurisdiction, such 
as those the Privy Council articulated, were open to interpretation 
in difficult cases.66 Because no jurisdictional rule is so rigid that it 
can be applied without interpretation, the question in any given 
constitutional dispute is how a jurisdictional rule should be 
interpreted. The question courts typically answer in constitutional 
disputes over the division of powers is whether a particular political 
unit has jurisdiction over a specific area of regulation. Of course, 
once that area has been allocated to a particular unit, one might 
say that that unit has a presumptive right of non-interference, but 
the principle of non-interference cannot enter into the 
determination of whether the unit has jurisdiction in the first place. 
Non-interference is the result of the application of a jurisdictional 
principle. It cannot provide the content of the jurisdictional 
principle itself.  
 
 Moreover, circumstances inevitably arise in federations when 
one piece of legislation, validly enacted by one political unit, enters 
into conflict with another piece of legislation, which is validly 
enacted by a second political unit. In these circumstances, one of 
the pieces of legislation prevails and, as a result, the prevailing 
legislature regulates in an area that the other legislature had 
jurisdiction to regulate. That second legislature therefore has its 
rights of non-interference compromised and, moreover, its 
legislative autonomy is limited because it is prevented from 
pursuing legislative ends that are within its jurisdiction to pursue. 
What is at issue in such cases is how to determine when 
                                                            
65.  Id., 75.  
66.  See Hoi KONG, “The Forms and Limits of Federalism Doctrine”, (2008) 13 
Rev. Const. Stud. 241, 250 [H. KONG, “Forms and Limits”] and the examples 
cited therein. 
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interference is justified. The jurisdictional rules do not, therefore, 
enforce a rigid rule of non-interference.   
 
  The positive law suggests that the principle of non-
domination can operate in conjunction with a presumption of non-
interference to yield a relatively stable set of institutionalized 
decision rules for a federation. The manner in which this set of rules 
operates is suggested by Young when she states that non-
interference is a prima facie rule.67 In Canada, provinces enjoy a 
presumption of non-interference in their areas of jurisdiction, but 
that presumption is subject to an exception when there is 
jurisdictional conflict.  Moreover, the content of the rules defining 
provincial jurisdiction and regulating conflicts can sometimes be 
shaped by the principle of non-domination. In the Canadian 
federation, an ensemble of doctrinal rules orders the relationship 
between the federal and provincial governments, and we shall soon 
see that the incorporation of the principle of non-domination into 
specific rules does not render that framework unacceptably 
unstable. Now that we have answered a general theoretical 
objection to the invocation of non-domination as a jurisdictional 
principle, we can turn our attention to a specific doctrinal 
illustration of how this principle functions.68  
 
C.  Non-Domination and the Federalism Jurisprudence of 
Justice Deschamps: the Criminal Law Power  
 
In the AHRA Reference, Justice Deschamps, writing with 
Justice Lebel, reasoned that in order for legislation to fall within the 
criminal law power, its purpose must be to “suppress an evil”.69 The 
Justices added that this purpose requirement can only be satisfied 
                                                            
67.  Young argued that the principle of non-interference for political units was 
“the prima facie principle in the internal jurisdiction of a self-determining 
unit” (I.M. YOUNG, Global Challenges, prec., note 62, p. 66). 
68.  The following discussion of the AHRA Reference, prec., note 4, draws on 
material previously published in H. KONG, “Beyond Functionalism”, prec., 
note 16.  
69.  AHRA Reference, prec., note 4, at par. 233. 
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if the federal government has “a concrete basis and a reasoned 
apprehension of harm”70 and if the conduct targeted is “inherently 
harmful”.71 The Justices fleshed out what they meant by “inherently 
harmful” conduct as they worked through the precedents and 
identified specific conduct in each of the cases considered that gave 
rise to risks of harm that could be reasonably apprehended.72 
Justices LeBel and Deschamps that with respect to the impugned 
provisions of the Act being ultra vires, Parliament did not act on the 
basis of a concrete and reasoned apprehension of harm. This comes 
out most clearly when the Justices wrote that “all activities related 
to assisted human reproduction are regulated, not just specific ones 
that Parliament could theoretically have considered — but in fact 
did not consider — reprehensible”.73 This passage suggests that in 
the Justices’ view, it would have been possible for Parliament to 
have had as its legislative purpose the targeting of activities that 
gave rise to a risk of harm. However, on the present facts, Justices 
LeBel and Deschamps reasoned that Parliament did not have such 
an objective and, therefore, that the impugned provisions were not 
supported by a valid criminal law purpose.74  
 
Justices LeBel and Deschamps’s reasons have implications 
for how broadly they read the criminal law power and how they 
understand the role of judges in constitutional adjudication. For 
Justices LeBel and Deschamps, the requirement of suppressing evil 
applies to all the specific examples of valid public purposes that are 
invoked in the case law, including the public purpose of morality.75 
By contrast, for the Chief Justice the valid public purpose 
requirement can be satisfied if legislation aims simply to address “a 
                                                            
70.  Id., par. 238. 
71.  Id., par. 251.  
72.  Id., par. 237. 
73.  Id., par. 250. 
74.  I believe this reading of the reasoning answers concerns that 
Justices LeBel and Deschamps’s definition of the criminal law power is 
overbroad. For such a concern, see Barbara VON TIGERSTROM, “Federal 
Health Legislation and the Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference”, 
(2011) 74 Sask. L. Rev. 33.  
75.  AHRA Reference, prec., note 4, at par. 238. 
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moral concern of fundamental importance”.76 Justices LeBel and 
Deschamps’s version of the public purpose requirement is narrower 
and therefore more restrictive of Parliament’s power to legislate 
under the criminal power than is the Chief Justice’s version. 
Moreover, the reasons of Justices LeBel and Deschamps evidence 
their greater faith in the capacity of judges to make categorical 
distinctions. In applying the test proposed by those Justices, a 
court would be obliged to distinguish inherently harmful conduct 
from other kinds of conduct and would have to identify a concrete 
basis for a reasonable apprehension of harm. The Chief Justice’s 
deferential test requires much less of courts; it is the additional 
burden imposed on courts by her colleagues that leads her to 
charge them with “substitut[ing] a judicial view of what is good and 
what is bad for the wisdom of Parliament”.77 According to the Chief 
Justice, her colleagues’ approach would “break new ground in 
enlarging the judiciary’s role in assessing valid criminal law 
objectives”.78 The Chief Justice’s concern can be understood to bear 
on the Court’s capacity to undertake such an expanded role, or the 
democratic legitimacy of its doing so. Justices Lebel and 
Deschamps do not in their reasons express these concerns, and in 
what follows, we shall see the republican significance of their 
stance. 
 
            The reasons of Justices LeBel and Deschamps control both 
the scope of the criminal power and the reasons for which the 
federal government can act under that power. Their definition of the 
criminal law power would limit the number of instances in which 
Parliament could validly legislate and be in a position to render 
provincial legislation inoperative. Moreover, one concern with a 
highly deferential and open-ended criminal law standard, such as 
the one that the Chief Justice adopts, is that it might permit 
                                                            
76.  Id., par. 50.  
77.  Id., par. 76. For the division of power significance of this constraint, see 
John D. WHYTE, “Federalism and Moral Regulation: A Comment on 
Reference Re Assisted Human Reproduction Act”, (2011) 74 Sask. L. Rev. 
45. 
78.  Id., 76. 
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Parliament to act for reasons that do not take into consideration the 
relevant constitutional interests. By contrast, a more exigent 
standard would compel Parliament to formulate purposes that are 
relevant to the applicable constitutional norm.79 It is, of course, one 
consequence of a highly deferential judicial posture that courts do 
not examine closely the reasons that motivate government action. 
In the AHRA Reference, such a posture would not require courts to 
examine closely the reasons behind Parliament’s invocation of a 
valid criminal purpose, and as a result would not impose a 
significant burden on Parliament to offer a constitutional 
justification for its actions.  It is worth noting that a requirement to 
provide jurisdictional reasons would not on its face create an 
unacceptably wide scope of judicial discretion. Indeed, the multi-
factored balancing tests that the Court has enunciated under the 
peace, order and good government power and the general trade and 
commerce power have been applied by courts for decades. 80  If 
judges are able to apply those tests without usurping legislative 
power or introducing an unacceptably high level of uncertainty into 
the constitutional framework, it is unclear why the LeBel-
Deschamps version of the criminal law power would be problematic.  
     
The effects of the LeBel-Deschamps definition of the criminal 
law power can be understood as evincing the general and the 
multinational republican conceptions of the Canadian federation 
and as giving content to the principle of subsidiarity. Under the 
general conception, these effects preserve a sphere of legislative 
autonomy which allows provincial legislatures, and enables citizens 
exercising their democratic agency through those legislatures, to 
check over-weaning exercises of federal power and the threats of 
domination to which these give rise. Moreover, under the 
multinational republican conception of the federation, the fact of 
the jurisdiction of Quebec facilitates the flourishing of a national 
                                                            
79.  In this respect, I aim to avoid the costs of what Joseph Arvay called the 
“positivist perspective” of the criminal law power. See Joseph J. ARVAY, 
“The Criminal Law Power in the Constitution: And Then Came McNeil and 
Dupond”, (1979) 11 Ottawa L. Rev. 1, 5.  
80.  For a formalist critique of these multi-factor doctrinal tests and its 
implications, see H. KONG, “Forms and Limits” prec., note 66, 249-50. 
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interest and protects that interest from the threat of domination. 
Yet the mere existence of the jurisdiction will not protect that 
interest if judicial doctrine is formulated in ways that give the 
federal government powers that enable it to regulate deeply in areas 
of provincial jurisdiction and for reasons of political will alone, 
rather than for reasons that have constitutional significance. Such 
broad and unconstrained powers, when combined with the doctrine 
of paramountcy, would subject the provinces to persistent 
uncertainty about when their constitutionally significant interests 
would be interfered with. To suffer from this degree of uncertainty 
is to be subject to domination. Reasons that limit the scope of 
federal powers and subject to meaningful scrutiny the kinds of 
justifications that Parliament invokes protect the provinces against 
such domination. And by protecting Quebec, these types of reasons 
protect a key multinational element of Canadian federalism. Indeed, 
a multinational concern was present in the AHRA Reference insofar 
as the federal legislation implicated matters regulated by the Civil 
Code of Quebec, which is itself a “civil constitution”.81 Those who 
understand the Civil Code to be an essential element of the national 
character of Quebec might see the multinational significance of 
Justices LeBel and Deschamps’s concerns82 about federal dupli-
cation of Civil Code provisions in the AHRA Reference.   
 
We have seen that the principle of subsidiarity aims to 
preserve local variation and diversity within a federation. The 
principle of non-domination, in its general and multinational forms, 
gives content to this aspiration by specifying what counts as a 
constitutionally significant form of diversity. And the constitutional 
reasoning of Justice Deschamps in the AHRA Reference provides a 
concrete example of how a multinational form of diversity can be 
preserved in the Canadian federation. The general case suggests 
that other forms of diversity can also be preserved by constitutional 
doctrines that aim to limit federal powers and to impose on 
Parliament a meaningful burden of justification. The arguments in 
this Part are therefore applicable across the full range of 
                                                            
81.  See Jean CARBONNIER, “Le Code civil”, in Pierre NORA (ed.), Les lieux de 
mémoire, vol. 2, La Nation, Paris, Gallimard, 1997, p. 1331. 
82.  AHRA Reference, prec., note 4, par. 225.   
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constitutional doctrines and should not be understood to be limited 
to the illustrative example selected for this paper.    
  
Conclusion 
  
This paper has drawn on the resources of republican political 
theory in order to explain features of Canadian federalism and to 
offer prescriptions about how the federation should be structured, 
in ways that accord with the principle of subsidiarity. In addition, 
the paper has attempted to offer a normatively defensible version of 
nationalism that can provide theoretical and doctrinal resources for 
resolving disputes that arise in multinational federations. There are 
potential pitfalls that are associated with the approach adopted in 
this paper. One might, for instance, be tempted to adopt a 
normative theory that is ill-suited for the legal order under analysis. 
This pitfall can, however, be avoided by carefully attending to the 
specific characteristics of the relevant legal order and modifying the 
normative theory selected in light of them. Another pitfall lies in 
assuming that one can apply a normative theory directly to legal 
disputes, without considering the limits of legal institutions. An 
analysis that is insensitive to such limits may ask of courts more 
than they are capable of delivering. One might, for example, expect 
judges to redress conditions of injustice that lie beyond their 
capacity to address. The jurisprudence of Justice Deschamps 
provides an example of how this pitfall can be avoided. Her reasons 
exhibit a deep understanding of the normative theories that are 
relevant to the interpretation and application of constitutional 
provisions, and an acute awareness of the limits of judicial 
competence. This principled pragmatism is one of the many reasons 
for which her jurisprudence is worthy of celebration, and it is 
evident in her adept handling of the principle of subsidiarity and its 
republicanism-related virtues.   
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